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Abstract The architecture of several data centers have been proposed as
alternatives to the conventional three-layer one. Most of them employ com-
modity equipment for cost reduction. Thus, robustness to failures becomes
even more important, because commodity equipment is more failure-prone.
Each architecture has a different network topology design with a specific level
of redundancy. In this work, we aim at analyzing the benefits of different data
center topologies taking the reliability and survivability requirements into ac-
count. We consider the topologies of three alternative data center architecture:
Fat-tree, BCube, and DCell. Also, we compare these topologies with a conven-
tional three-layer data center topology. Our analysis is independent of specific
equipment, traffic patterns, or network protocols, for the sake of generality. We
derive closed-form formulas for the Mean Time To Failure of each topology.
The results allow us to indicate the best topology for each failure scenario.
In particular, we conclude that BCube is more robust to link failures than
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the other topologies, whereas DCell has the most robust topology when con-
sidering switch failures. Additionally, we show that all considered alternative
topologies outperform a three-layer topology for both types of failures. We also
determine to which extent the robustness of BCube and DCell is influenced
by the number of network interfaces per server.
Keywords Data center networks · cloud networks · survivability · reliability ·
robustness
1 Introduction
Data center networking has been receiving a lot of attention in the last few
years as it plays an essential role in cloud computing and big data applications.
In particular, as data center (DC) sizes steadily increase, operational expendi-
tures (OPEX) and capital expenditures (CAPEX) become more and more im-
portant in the choice of the DC network (DCN) architecture [1]. Conventional
DCN architecture employing high-end equipment suffers from prohibitive costs
for large network sizes [2]. As a consequence, a variety of alternative DCN
architecture has been proposed to better meet cost efficiency, scalability, and
communication requirements. Among the most cited alternative DCN architec-
ture, we can mention Fat-tree [2], BCube [3], and DCell [4]. These architecture
have different topologies but share the goal of providing a modular infrastruc-
ture using low-cost equipment. The conventional DC topologies and Fat-tree
are switch-centric, where only switches forward packets, whereas BCube and
DCell are server-centric topologies, where servers also participate in packet
forwarding.
Although the utilization of low-cost network elements reduces the CAPEX
of a DC, it also likely makes the network more failure prone [2,3,5]. Hence, in
the medium to long term, low-cost alternatives would incur in OPEX increase,
caused by the need to restore the network. The tradeoff between CAPEX and
OPEX can be more significant if we consider the increasing deployment of
DCs in environments with difficult access for maintenance, e.g., within a sealed
shipping container (e.g., Modular Data Center) [3]. In this case, repairing or
replacing failed elements can be very cumbersome. Therefore, the DCN needs
to be robust, i.e., it should survive as long as possible without going through
maintenance procedures. Network robustness is thus an important concern in
the design of low-cost DCN architecture.
DCN robustness depends on the physical topology and on the ability of
protocols to react to failures. In this work, we focus on the first aspect, by
analyzing the performance of recently proposed DCN topologies under fail-
ure conditions. Although fault-tolerant network protocols are mandatory to
guarantee network robustness, in the long term the topological organization
of DCNs plays a major role. In current literature, alternative DCN topologies
have been analyzed in terms of cost [6], scalability [7], and network capacity [3].
Guo et. al [3] also addresses DCN robustness, by comparing Fat-tree, BCube,
and DCell alternatives when there are switch or server failures. Nevertheless,
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as this comparison is not the primary focus of [3], the topologies are analyzed
with respect to only one robustness criterion. Also, the conclusions of Guo et.
al are bound to specific traffic patterns and routing protocols.
In this work, we provide a generic, protocol-, hardware-, and traffic-agnostic
analysis of DCN robustness, focusing on topological characteristics. Our moti-
vation is that as commodity equipment is increasingly employed in DCNs, DC
designers have a wide and heterogeneous vendor choice. Hence, we do not limit
our analysis to specific vendors. Also, as a DCN topology might be employed
by different applications, its robustness analysis should be independent of the
traffic matrix. We analyze robustness aspects of Fat-tree, BCube, and DCell.
As detailed later, we focus on these representative topologies because they
have been receiving a lot of attention in recent literature and because they
are conceived to be based on low-cost equipment. Also, we compare the alter-
native topologies with a conventional three-layer DCN topology. In summary,
the contributions of this article are as follows:
– We point out the characteristics that make the analyzed topologies more
vulnerable or robust to certain types of failures. We show that BCube and
DCell outperform Fat-tree both on link and switch failures. In a Fat-tree,
when a given fraction of the total links or switches fail, the number of
reachable servers is reduced by the same fraction. BCube topology is the
most robust against link failures, maintaining at least 84% of its servers
connected when 40% of its links are down, while in DCell this lower bound
is 74% of servers. On the other hand, DCell is the best one for switch fail-
ures, maintaining 100% of its servers for a period up to 12 times longer
than BCube. We also observe that the robustness to failures grows propor-
tionally to the number of server network interfaces in BCube and DCell.
Finally, we show that all alternative DCN topologies outperform a three-
layer topology in terms of both link and switch failures.
– We characterize and analyze the DCN, both analytically and by simula-
tion, against each failure type (i.e., link, switch, or server) separately. Our
proposed methodology relies on the MTTF (Mean Time To Failure) and on
other metrics regarding the path length and DCN reachability. In particu-
lar, we provide closed-form formulas to model the MTTF of the considered
topologies, and to predict server disconnections, thus helping to estimate
DCN maintenance periods.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 details the topologies used in
this work. Section 3 describes our proposed methodology. The evaluation, as
well as the description of metrics, are presented in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6
summarizes the obtained results with a qualitative evaluation of DCN topolo-
gies. Section 7 addresses the sensibility of the used metrics according to the
choice of DCN gateways. Section 8 complements the evaluation, considering
that the DCN is composed of heterogeneous equipment. Finally, Section 9 dis-
cusses related work and Section 10 concludes this article and presents future
directions.
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2 Data Center Network Topologies
DCN topologies can be structured or unstructured. Structured topologies have
a deterministic formation rule and are built by connecting basic modules. They
can be copper-only topologies, employing exclusively copper connections (e.g.,
Gigabit Ethernet), as conventional three-layer DC topologies, Fat-tree, BCube,
and DCell; or can be hybrid, meaning that they also use optical links to im-
prove energy efficiency and network capacity, as C-Through and Helios [8]. On
the other hand, unstructured topologies do not have a deterministic formation
rule. These topologies can be built by using a stochastic algorithm (e.g., Jel-
lyfish [9]) or the output of an optimization problem (e.g., REWIRE [10]). The
advantage of unstructured topologies is that they are easier to scale up, as they
do not have a rigid structure. In this work, we focus on structured copper-only
topologies, since they are receiving major attention in literature [11,12]. Next,
we detail the topologies analyzed in this work.
2.1 Three-layer
Most of today’s commercial DCNs employ a conventional hierarchical topol-
ogy, composed of three layers: the edge, the aggregation, and the core [13].
There is no unique definition in the literature for a conventional three-layer
DC topology, since it highly depends on DC design decisions and commer-
cial equipment specifications. Hence, we define our conventional Three-layer
topology based on a DCN architecture recommended by Cisco in [13]. In the
Three-layer topology, the core layer is composed of two switches directly con-
nected between each other, which act as DC gateways. Each core switch is
connected to all aggregation switches. The aggregation switches are organized
in pairs, where in each pair the aggregation switches are directly connected to
each other, as in Figure 1. Each aggregation switch in a pair is connected to
the same group of na edge switches. Each edge switch has ne ports to connect
directly to the servers. Hence, each pair of aggregation switches provides con-
nectivity to na ∗ ne servers and we need
|S|
na∗ne
pairs to build a DC with |S|
servers. A module is a group of servers in Three-layer where the connectivity
is maintained by the same pair of aggregation switches. Figure 1 shows an
example of a Three-layer topology with 16 servers, na = 4 and ne = 2.
In commercial DCNs, edge switches are generally connected to the servers
using 1 Gbps Ethernet ports. The ports that connect the aggregation switches
to the core and edge switches are generally 10 Gbps Ethernet. Hence, as can
be noted, three-layer topologies employ high capacity equipment in the core
and aggregation layers. The alternative DC architecture propose topological
enhancements to enable the utilization of commodity switches throughout the
network, as we describe next.
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Fig. 1 Three-layer topology with 2 edge ports (ne = 2) and 4 aggregation ports (na = 4).
Fig. 2 Fat-tree with 4-port switches (n = 4).
2.2 Fat-tree
We refer to Fat-tree as the DCN topology proposed in [2], designed using the
concept of “fat-tree”, a special case of a Clos network. VL2 [14] also uses a Clos
network but is not considered in our analysis because it is very similar to the
Fat-tree. As shown in Figure 2, the Fat-tree topology has two sets of elements:
core and pods. The first set is composed of switches that interconnect the
pods. Pods are composed of aggregation switches, edge switches, and servers.
Each port of each switch in the core is connected to a different pod through
an aggregation switch. Within a pod, the aggregation switches are connected
to all edge switches. Finally, each edge switch is connected to a different set
of servers. Unlike conventional DC topologies, Fat-tree is built using links and
switches of the same capacity.
All switches have n ports. Hence, the network has n pods, and each pod
has n2 aggregation switches connected to
n
2 edge switches. The edge switches
are individually connected to n2 different servers. Thus, using n-port switches,
a Fat-tree can have n2 ∗
n
2 ∗ n =
n3
4 servers. Figure 2 shows a Fat-tree for
n = 4. Note that Fat-tree employs a more redundant core than the Three-
layer topology.
2.3 BCube
The BCube topology was designed for Modular Data Centers (MDC) that need
a high network robustness [3]. A BCube is organized in layers of commodity
mini-switches and servers, which participate in packet forwarding. The main
module of a BCube is BCube0, which consists of a single switch with n ports
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Fig. 3 BCube with 4-port switches (n = 4) and 2-port servers (l = 1).
Fig. 4 DCell with 4-port switches (n = 4) and 2-port servers (l = 1).
connected to n servers. A BCube1, on the other hand, is constructed using
n BCube0 networks and n switches. Each switch is connected to all BCube0
networks through one server of each BCube0. Figure 3 shows a BCube1. More
generally, a BCubel (l ≥ 1) network consists of n BCubel−1s and n
l switches
of n ports. To build a BCubel, the n Bcubel−1s are numbered from 0 to n− 1
and the servers of each one from 0 to nl − 1. Next, the level l port of the i-th
server (i ∈ [0, nl − 1]) of the j-th BCubel (j ∈ [0, n− 1]) is connected to the
j-th port of the i-th level l switch. A BCubel can have n
l+1 servers. In BCube,
servers participate in packet forwarding but are not directly connected.
2.4 DCell
Similar to BCube, DCell is defined recursively and uses servers and mini-
switches for packet forwarding. The main module is DCell0 which, as in
BCube0, is composed of a switch connected to n servers. A DCell1 is built by
connecting n+1 DCell0 networks, where a DCell0 is connected to every other
DCell0 via a link connecting two servers. A DCell1 network is illustrated in
Figure 4.
Note that in a DCell, unlike a BCube, switches are connected only to servers
in the same DCell and the connection between different DCell networks goes
through servers. To build a DCelll, n+1 DCelll−1 networks are needed. Each
server in a DCelll has l+1 links, where the first link (level 0 link) is connected
to the switch of its DCell0, the second link connects the server to a node on
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Fig. 5 Evolution of the DC reachability. As more network elements fail, more servers are
disconnected and thus the reachability decreases.
its DCell1, but in another DCell0, and so on. Generalizing, the level i link of
a server connects it to a different DCelli−1 in the same DCelli. The procedure
to build a DCell is more complex than that of a BCube, and is executed by
the algorithm described in [4].
The DCell capacity in a number of servers can be evaluated recursively,
using the following equations: gl = tl−1 + 1 and tl = gl × tl−1, where gl is the
number of DCelll−1 networks in a DCelll, and tl is the number of servers in
a DCelll. A DCell0 network is a special case in which g0 = 1 and t0 = n.
3 Analysis Methodology
As the operating time of a DCN progresses, more network elements would fail
and thus server reachability (i.e., number of connected servers and the connec-
tivity between them) levels are expected to decrease. A server is considered
disconnected when it has no paths to the DCN gateways, i.e., to the switches
providing access to external networks like the Internet. In this work, we evalu-
ate DCNs, considering the failures of a given network element type, i.e., link,
switch, or server. Each type of failure is evaluated separately to analyze its
particular influence. Independent of the element type, we define the lifetime
as the amount of time until the disconnection of all DC servers. Despite this
theoretical definition in this work we do not analyze the DCN behavior for
the whole lifetime, since it is not practical to have a DC with almost all its
servers disconnected. To quantify the failures, we define the Failed Elements
Ratio (FER), which is the fraction of failed elements of a given network el-
ement type (link, switch, or server). If no maintenance is performed on the
DC, which is the case considered in this work, the FER for a given equipment
type will increase as the time passes, meaning that more network elements
are under failure. Figure 5 illustrates a hypothetical situation of the FER evo-
lution according to the time. Starting the lifetime by the moment where a
full maintenance was completed, a DC passes through a first phase in which
failures do not cause server disconnection, defined here as the Reliable Phase,
and a second phase where at least one server is disconnected, that we define as
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(a)Reliable Phase. (b)Survival Phase. (c)Dead Phase.
Fig. 6 The different phases a network undergoes when facing link failures.
the Survival Phase. The lifetime period ends when the DC has no connected
servers. After that, the DC enters the Dead Phase. Figure 6 depicts each phase
of a hypothetical network, only considering link failures. In this figure, each
failed link is represented by a dashed line, an inaccessible server is represented
with a cross, and the switch that acts as a gateway is colored in black. The
disconnected fraction of the DC is circled in the figure. We can see that on the
Reliable Phase the DCN can have failed links and on the Dead Phase it can
have links that are still up.
Regarding the Reliable Phase, the circled letters in Figure 5 point out two
metrics of interest. These are
– A: Indicates time elapsed until the first server is disconnected, called TTF
(Time to Failure). In this work, we evaluate the mean value of this metric,
called MTTF (Mean Time To Failure), which is the expected value of the
TTF in a network (i.e., mean time elapsed until the first server disconnec-
tion).
– B: Indicates the minimum value of FER that produces a server discon-
nection. In this work, we evaluate this metric as a mean value, called the
Critical FER. For example, a network with 100 switches that disconnects
a server, on average, after the removal of 2 random switches, has a critical
FER of 2100 = 0.02. The mean time to have a Critical FER is thus equal
to the MTTF.
The Survival Phase deserves special attention if one is interested in quan-
tifying the network degradation; for this phase, in Section 5.1 we define and
analyze the following in a set of representative metrics: Service Reachability
and Path Quality.
3.1 Link and Node Failures
3.1.1 Failure Model
Our failure model is based on the following assumptions:
– Failure isolation: Each type of failure (link, switch or server) is analyzed
separately. This is important to quantify the impact of a given element
type on the considered topologies.
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– Failure probability: For the sake of simplicity, all the elements have the
same probability of failure and the failures are independent of each other.
– Repairs: The elements are not repairable. This is important to study how
much time the network can operate without maintenance (e.g., Modular
Data Center, where equipment repair is a difficult task).
3.1.2 Failure Metrics
We analyze failures from both a spatial and temporal perspective, using the
two following metrics:
Failed Elements Ratio (FER). Defined before, this metric quantifies
only the extension of the failures and does not depend on the probability
distribution of the element lifetime. In the following, we also use the more
specific term “Failed Links/Switches/Servers Ratio” to emphasize the failure
type.
Elapsed Time. As the time passes, more elements would fail. In this case,
the elapsed time since the last full maintenance can indirectly characterize the
failure state. For a given FER, we have an expected time that this ratio will
occur. It is worth mentioning that time can be defined in two ways: absolute
and normalized. In the former, we measure the time in hours, days or months.
In the latter, we normalize the time by the mean lifetime of an individual
link or node, as detailed next. This measure is important to make the analysis
independent of the mean lifetime, being agnostic to hardware characteristics.
3.2 Failure Simulation
A topology is modeled as an undirected, unweighted graph G = (V , E), where
V is the set of servers and switches, and E is the set of links. The set V is
given by V = S ∪ C, where S is the server set and C is the switch set. To
simulate the scenario of Section 3.1.1, we randomly remove either S ′, C′, or E ′
from G, where S ′ ⊂ S, C′ ⊂ C and E ′ ⊂ E , generating the subgraph G′. Note
that we separately analyze each set of elements (switches, servers, and links).
Finally, the metrics are evaluated by using the graph G′. Unless otherwise
stated, all metrics are represented with their average values and confidence
intervals, evaluated with a confidence level of 95%. As can be seen next in this
work, our results have a very narrow confidence interval, and thus, most of
these intervals are difficult to visualize in the curves.1
The evaluation starts by removing f elements from G, where 0 ≤ f ≤ F
and F is the total number of elements of a given type (link, switch or server)
present on the original graph G. After that, we evaluate our metrics of interest
as a function of f . The FER and Elapsed Time (Section 3.1.2) are computed,
respectively, by f
F
and by the mean time that f elements fail, given that we
have F possibilities of failure (i.e., the total number of elements of a given
1 Topology generation, failure simulation, and metric evaluation are obtained using the
graph manipulation tool NetworkX [15].
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type). To evaluate this amount of time, we first need to define a probability
distribution for element failures. For simplicity, following a widely adopted
approach, we consider that failures are independent and that the time τ that
an element fails is random and follows an exponential distribution with mean
E[τ ] [16,17]. Hence, the mean time to have f failed elements (Elapsed Time)
is given by the following equation derived from Order Statistics [18]:
AT = E[τ ]
f−1∑
i=0
1
F − i
, for f ≤ F. (1)
Equation 1 gives the Absolute Time defined in Section 3.1.2. Note that we can
make it independent of E[τ ] by dividing the right term of Equation 1 by E[τ ].
The result is the Normalized Time given by
NT =
f−1∑
i=0
1
F − i
, for f ≤ F. (2)
3.3 Operational Subnetworks After Failures
In our analysis, we first have to identify whether a network is operational
to compute the metrics of interest. As failures may split the DCN, we define
operational as all the connected (sub)networks that have at least one gateway2.
This node plays a fundamental role since it is responsible for interconnecting
the DC with external networks, as the Internet. Hence, a subnetwork that
has no gateway is not considered operational because it cannot receive remote
commands to assign tasks to servers. A server in an operational network is
considered as connected.
As typical definitions of DCN topologies are not aware of gateway place-
ment, we assume that all switches at the highest hierarchical level of each
topology are in charge of such a task. For the topologies considered, we have
the following possible gateways:
– Three-layer: The two core switches
– Fat-tree: All core switches
– BCube: For a BCube of level l, all the l-level switches
– DCell: As there is no switch hierarchy in this topology, we consider that
all switches are at the top level and therefore can be a gateway.
A possible issue with the above choices is that the comparison between
topologies may be unfair depending on how many gateways we choose for
each of them. We thus define a metric of reference, called the Gateway Port
Density (GPD):
GPD =
n ∗ g
|S|
, (3)
2 We call gateway in this work a switch that is responsible for the network access outside
the DC. In practice, the gateway function is performed by a router connected to this switch.
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where n is the number of ports on the gateway, g is the number of gateways
and |S| is the total number of servers in the network. The GPD gives an idea
on the number of ports per server available in the gateways. As each gateway
has n ports, the DC has n ∗ g ports acting as the last access to the traffic
before leaving the DC. Note that the number of ports connecting the gateway
to outside the DCN is not accounted in n, since n is the number of switch
ports as given by each topology definition (Section 2). We assume that each
gateway has one or more extra ports that provide external access. In addition,
we do not consider the failure of these extra ports. The maximum GPD (i.e.,
if we use all possible switches) for Fat-tree, BCube, and DCell is equal to 1.
As the Three-layer topology uses only two core switches, its maximum GPD
is very low (e.g., 0.007 for a network with 3456 servers). Hence, unless stated
otherwise, we use all the possible switches for all topologies in our evaluations.
We do not equalize all topologies with the maximum GPD of the Three-layer
one to provide a better comparison between alternative DC topologies. In
addition, we show later in this work that this choice does not change our
conclusions regarding the comparison between the Three-layer topology and
the alternative ones.
4 Reliable Phase
The Reliable Phase corresponds to the period until the disconnection of the
first server. It quantifies the amount of time a DC administrator can wait until
the next network maintenance intervention makes the network fully reachable.
We qualify the DCN performance in the Reliable Phase both theoretically and
by simulation, as explained in this section.
4.1 Theoretical analysis
The MTTF can be evaluated as a function of the reliability, R(t). R(t) is
defined as the probability that the network is on the Reliable Phase (i.e., all
its servers are accessible) at time t. In other words, considering that the time
spent in the Reliable Phase is a random variable T , the reliability is defined
as R(t) = P (T > t) = 1 − P (T ≤ t). Note that P (T ≤ t) is the CDF
(Cumulative Distribution Function) of the random variable T . As the MTTF
is the expected value E[T ], we can use the definition of E[T ] for non-negative
random variables as shown in the following:
MTTF =
∫ ∞
0
1− P (T ≤ t) dt =
∫ ∞
0
R(t) dt. (4)
We evaluate R(t) by using the Burtin-Pittel approximation [19] to network
reliability given by
R(t) = 1−
trc
E[τ ]r
+O
(
1
E[τ ]
r+1)
≈ e−
t
r
c
E[τ]r , (5)
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whereE[τ ] is the expected (i.e., average) time that an element fails, considering
that τ follows an exponential probability distribution. The parameters c and r
are the number of min-cut sets and their size, respectively. A min-cut set is a
set with the minimum number of elements that causes a server disconnection.
For example, considering only link failures on the network of Figure 1, a min-
cut set consists of a link between the server and the edge switch. Considering
only switch failures in Figure 1, a min-cut set is an edge switch. The min-
cut size is the number of elements (links, switches, or servers) in a single set
(e.g., equal to 1 in the above mentioned examples). In Equation 5, t
rc
E[τ ]r is the
contribution of the min-cut sets to R(t) and O
(
1
E[τ ]
r+1
)
is an upper bound to
the contribution of other cut sets. The idea behind the approximation is that if
E[τ ] is high (i.e., the failure rate of an individual element is low), R(t) is mainly
affected by the min-cut sets. This is valid for a DCN, since it is expected to
have a large lifetime even for commodity equipment [20]. The approximation
is done by using the fact that the term 1− t
rc
E[τ ]r in Equation 5 coincides with
the first two terms of the Taylor expansion of e−
t
r
c
E[τ]r . Hence, considering that
the contribution of the other cut sets is as small as the remaining terms of the
Taylor expansion, we can write R(t) ≈ e−
t
r
c
E[τ]r .
Combining Equations 4 and 5, as detailed in Appendix A, we rewrite the
MTTF as:
MTTF ≈
E[τ ]
r
r
√
1
c
Γ
(
1
r
)
, (6)
where Γ (x) is the gamma function of x [21]. With this equation, the MTTF
is written as a function of c and r that, as we show later, depends on the
topology employed and on its parameters.
4.2 Simulation-based analysis
The simulation is provided to measure the accuracy of the MTTF approxima-
tion stated before. For each simulation sample, we find the minimum number
of f elements of a given type that disconnects a server from the network. This
value is called the critical point. The Normalized MTTF (NMTTF) in a sample
can thus be evaluated by setting f equal to the critical point in Equation 2. The
simulated value of MTTF (NMTFsim) is thus the average of the NMTTF val-
ues considering all samples. Algorithm 1 summarizes the simulation procedure.
The function removeRandomElement removes one random element of a given
type (link, switch, or server) following the procedure described in Section 3.2.
In addition, the function allServersAreConnected checks if all the servers in
the networkG′ (i.e., network with f removed elements of a given type) are con-
nected, as defined in Section 3.3. When the function removeRandomElements
leads to a G′ with at least one disconnected server, the simulation stops and
line 10 evaluates the Normalized MTTF (NMTTF) using Equation 2, adding
this measure to the accNMTTF variable. The accNMTTF is thus the sum of the
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NMTTF values found in all samples. At the end, this variable is divided by the
total number of samples nrSamples to achieve the average value of NMTTF
(NMTFsim) found on the simulation. Note that the simulated MTTF can be
evaluated by multiplying NMTFsim by E[τ ] , as indicated by Equation 1. The
parameter nrSamples is set in this work in the order of thousands of samples
to reach a small confidence interval.
Algorithm 1: NMTTF simulation
Input: element type type, number of experimental samples nrSamples, total
number of elements F , original network G.
Output: Simulated NMTTF NMTTFsim.
1 sample = 1;
2 accNMTTF = 0;
3 while sample ≤ nrSamples do
4 G′ = G;
5 f = 0;
6 while (f < F ) and allServersAreConnected(G′) do
7 f += 1;
8 G′ = removeRandomElement (type,G′);
9 end
10 accNMTTF +=
∑f−1
i=0
1
F−i
;
11 sample += 1;
12 end
13 NMTTFsim =
accNMTTF
nrSamples
;
The comparison between the simulated and theoretical MTTF is done using
the Relative Error (RE) defined as:
RE =
|NMTTFsim −NMTTFtheo|
NMTTFsim
, (7)
where NMTTFtheo is the normalized theoretical MTTF, obtained by dividing
the MTTF by E[τ ], andNMTTFsim is the value obtained in the simulation. It
is important to note that, as shown in Equation 6, the MTTF can be expressed
by a first order term of E[τ ]. Consequently, we do not need, in practice, to use
the value of E[τ ] to normalize the theoretical MTTF, needing only to remove
this term from the equation. Using the results of RE, we show in Section 4.3 in
which cases Equation 6 is an accurate approximation for the MTTF. In these
cases, we show that the MTTF for each topology can be approximated as a
function of the number of server network interfaces and the number of servers.
4.3 Results
In this section, we use the metrics detailed before to evaluate the topologies of
Table 1 in the Reliable Phase. We compare configurations with approximately
the same number of connected servers. It is worth mentioning that although
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Table 1 DCN topology configurations used in the analysis.
Size Name
Switch Server
Links Switches Servers
ports ports
500
Three-layer 2(core) 1 605 16 576
Fat-tree 12 1 1296 180 432
BCube2 22 2 968 44 484
BCube3 8 3 1536 192 512
DCell2 22 2 759 23 506
DCell3 4 3 840 105 420
3k
Three-layer 12(core) 1 3630 86 3456
Fat-tree 24 1 10368 720 3456
BCube2 58 2 6728 116 3364
BCube3 15 3 10125 670 3375
BCube5 5 5 15625 3125 3125
DCell2 58 2 5133 59 3422
DCell3 7 3 6384 456 3192
8k
Three-layer 28(core) 1 8470 198 8064
Fat-tree 32 1 24576 1280 8192
BCube2 90 2 16200 180 8100
BCube3 20 3 24000 1190 8000
BCube5 6 5 38880 6480 7776
DCell2 90 2 12285 91 8190
DCell3 9 3 16380 910 8190
some of these topologies can be incrementally deployed, we only consider com-
plete topologies where all servers’ and switches’ network interfaces are in use.
Furthermore, for alternative DC topologies, the number of switch ports is not
limited to the number of ports often seen in commercially available equipment
(e.g., 8, 24, and 48) to produce a similar number of servers for the compared
topologies. As one of the key goals of a DC is to provide processing capacity or
storage redundancy, which increases with the number of servers, balancing the
number of servers per topology is an attempt to provide a fair analysis. For
the Three-layer topology, we fix ne = 48 and na = 12, based on commercial
equipment description found in [13]. Hence, for all configurations, each pair
of aggregation switches provides connectivity to 576 servers. As we employ a
fixed number of ports in the aggregation and edge layers for the Three-layer
topology, we specify in Table 1 only the number of ports in a core switch
connected to aggregation switches. We provide below the analysis according
to each type of failure. We do not evaluate the reliability to server failures
because a network failure is considered whenever one server is disconnected.
Hence, a single server failure is needed to change from the Reliable to the
Survival Phase.
4.3.1 Link Failures
To provide the theoretical MTTF for link failures, we use Equation 6 with the
values r and c corresponding to each topology. Table 2 shows these values for
all considered topologies. For all topologies, the min-cut size is the number of
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Table 2 Min-cut size and number considering link failures.
Topology Min-cut size (r) Number of min-cuts (c)
Three-layer 1 |S|
Fat-tree 1 |S|
BCube l + 1 |S|
DCell l + 1 1.5|S| if l = 1 , |S| otherwise
server interfaces, which is always 1 for Three-layer and Fat-tree, and l+ 1 for
BCube and DCell. Also, except for DCell with l = 1, the number of min-cuts is
equal to the number of servers. For DCell with l = 1, we have another min-cut
possibility, different from the disconnection of l + 1 = 2 links from a single
server. We call this possibility a “server island”, which appears when the two
connected servers lose the link to their corresponding switch. As an example,
consider that in Figure 4 Server 0 inDCell00 and Server 3 in DCell01 have lost
the link with their corresponding switches. These two servers remain connected
to each other but when disconnected from the network, they form a server
island. In DCell with l = 1, each server is directly connected with only one
server, since each one has two interfaces. Then, the number of possible server
islands is 0.5|S| and the number of min-cuts is given by |S|+ 0.5|S| = 1.5|S|.
For a DCell with l > 1, the number of link failures that produces a server
island is greater than l + 1 and therefore, this situation is not a min-cut.
Using the values of Table 2 in Equation 6, we get the following MTTF
approximations, for link failures:
MTTFthreeLayer =MTTFfatTree ≈
E[τ ]
|S|
; (8)
MTTFdcell ≈


E[τ ]
2
√
1
1.5|S|Γ
(
1
2
)
, if l = 1;
E[τ ]
l+1
l+1
√
1
|S|Γ
(
1
l+1
)
otherwise .
(9)
MTTFbcube ≈
E[τ ]
l+ 1
l+1
√
1
|S|
Γ
(
1
l + 1
)
. (10)
The results of Figure 7(a) show the RE (Equation 7) for different network
sizes. The figure shows that the MTTF estimation using min-cuts has less than
a 10% error.
Given the above equations and their comparison in Appendix B, we can
conclude that:3
– Three-layer and Fat-tree Performance. The two topologies have the same
MTTF, presenting the lowest reliability considering link failures. According
3 Hereafter, we split the result remarks in three items. The first one comments the per-
formance of switch-centric topologies (Three-layer and Fat-tree), while the second one high-
lights the results of server-centric topologies (i.e., BCube and DCell). The last item, when
available, indicates a general remark considering the three topologies.
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Fig. 7 Reliable Phase analysis for link failures.
to the equations, the MTTF of Three-layer and Fat-tree is
√
|S|pi
6 lower
than the worst case for a server-centric topology (DCell2). Hence, for a
DCN with 3400 servers, the MTTF of Three-layer and Fat-tree is at least
42 times lower than that of server-centric topologies.
– BCube and DCell Performance. BCube has the same MTTF as DCell,
except for two server interfaces where BCube performs better. However, as
given by the equations, BCube2 is merely 1.23 times better than DCell2
for any |S|. In BCube and DCell, the increase in the number of server
interfaces increases the MTTF.
– General Remarks. A higher number of servers |S| leads to a lower MTTF.
This result emphasizes the importance of caring about reliability in large
DCs, where |S| can be in the order of thousands of servers.
Figure 7(b) shows the simulation of the Normalized MTTF and Critical FER
for 3k-server topologies as an example. Note that the reliability of Three-layer
and Fat-tree is substantially lower than that of the other topologies, and as a
consequence their corresponding boxes cannot be seen in Figure 7(b).
4.3.2 Switch Failures
We employ the same methodology of Section 4.3.1 to verify if we can use min-
cuts to approximate the reliability when the network is prone to switch failures.
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Table 3 shows r and c values for this case. In Three-layer and Fat-tree, a single
failure of an edge switch is enough to disconnect a server. Hence, the size of
the min-cut is 1 and the number of min-cuts is the number of edge switches.
In Three-layer, the number of edge switches is simply |S|
ne
, where ne is the
number of edge ports. In a Fat-tree of n ports, each edge switch is connected
to n2 servers, and thus, the number of edge switches is
|S|
n
2
. As |S| = n
3
4 , we can
write n = 3
√
4|S| and therefore, the number of min-cuts is 3
√
2|S|2. For BCube,
a switch min-cut happens when, for a single server, the l+1 switches connected
to it fail. The number of possible min-cuts is thus equal to the number of servers
|S|, as each server has a different set of connected switches. As in the case of
DCell, the reasoning is more complex. A min-cut is the set of switches needed
to form a server island. Although min-cuts for link failures generate server
islands only in DCell2, all min-cuts generate this situation in both DCell2 and
DCell3 for switch failures. For DCell2, it is easy to see that a server island
is formed if two servers that are directly connected lose their corresponding
switches, therefore r = 2. As observed in Section 4.3.1, the number of possible
server islands is the number of pairs of servers, given by 0.5|S|. For DCell3,
we obtain the values r and c by analyzing DCell graphs for different values of
n with l = 2. We observe that r is always equal to 8, independent of n. Also,
we observe the formation of server islands. Every island has servers from 4
different DCell modules of level l = 1. Moreover, each DCell with l = 1 has
2 servers from the island. Obviously, these 2 servers are directly connected to
each other, from different DCell modules with l = 0. Based on the analysis of
different graphs, we find that DCell3 has c =
(
n+2
4
)
. Hence, we can formulate
the min-cuts for DCell2 and DCell3 as r = 2l2 and c =
(
n+l
2l
)
. Note that,
for DCell2 c =
(
n+1
2
)
= 0.5 ∗ [n(n + 1)] = 0.5|S|, corresponding to the value
found before. For DCell3 we find c =
(
n+2
4
)
= 0.125(2|S| − 3
√
4|S|+ 1 + 3),
by replacing n with the solution of |S| = [n(n+1)][(n+1)n+1]. We leave the
evaluation of r and c for DCell with l > 2 as a subject for future work.
Table 3 Min-cut size and number considering switch failures.
Topology Min-cut size (r) Number of min-cuts (c)
Three-layer 1
|S|
ne
Fat-tree 1 3
√
2|S|2
BCube l + 1 |S|
DCell (l ≤ 2) 2l2
(
n+l
2l
)
Using Table 3 values in Equation 6, we evaluate the theoretical MTTF
for switch failures. We compare these values with simulations using the same
methodology as before, resulting in the RE shown in Figure 8(a). As the figure
shows, the min-cut approximation is not well suited for switch failures in some
topologies. The topologies that perform well for all network sizes of Table 1
are Three-layer, Fat-tree, BCube5, and BCube3. The error for BCube2 is close
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Fig. 8 Reliable Phase analysis for switch failures.
to 40%. The results for DCell show a bad approximation, since the minimum
RE achieved was 27%. However, we can write the exact MTTF for DCell2,
since a failure in any two switches is enough to form a server island, as seen in
Figure 4. Its MTTF is thus the time needed to have 2 switch failures, produced
by doing f = 2 and F = n+ 1 (i.e., total number of switches) in Equation 1,
and writing the number of switch ports as a function of the number of servers4
as n = 0.5(−1 +
√
4|S|+ 1):
MTTFdcell =
E[τ ]
√
4|S|+ 1
|S|
, for l = 1. (11)
Based on the above analysis of RE, we have a low relative error when using
the Burtin-Pittel approximation to estimate MTTF for Three-layer, Fat-tree,
and BCube for l > 1. We can then write their MTTF using the following
equations:
MTTFthreeLayer ≈
E[τ ]ne
|S|
; (12)
MTTFfatTree ≈
E[τ ]
3
√
2|S|2
; (13)
4 The number of switch ports n in function of |S| is evaluated by solving the equation
|S| = n(n+ 1).
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MTTFbcube ≈
E[τ ]
l + 1
l+1
√
1
|S|
Γ
(
1
l + 1
)
, for l > 1. (14)
Figure 8(b) shows the simulation of the Reliable Phase considering a 3k-
server network. Since we do not have MTTF equations for all topology con-
figurations, we compare the topologies using these results. It is important to
note that this same comparison holds for the network with sizes 500 and 8k.
In summary, we conclude that:
– Three-layer and Fat-tree Performance. Three-layer and Fat-tree have very
low reliability compared with other topologies, because a single failure in
an edge switch disconnects the network. The MTTF of Fat-tree for 3k-
server topologies is approximately 7.3 times lower than that of BCube2,
which is the server-centric topology with the lowest MTTF.
– BCube and DCell Performance. The number of server interfaces increases
the MTTF, as in the case of link failures. Also, DCell has a higher reliability
than BCube. This is due to less dependence on switches in DCell, as in
DCell, each server is connected to 1 switch and l servers while on BCube,
only switches are attached to the servers. Although the performance of
DCell2 is close to BCube2, the MTTF and Critical FER are much higher
in DCell3 than in BCube3. The results show that, for 3k-server topologies,
DCell3 is still fully connected when 50% of the switches are down, and its
MTTF is 12 times higher than that of BCube3.
5 Survival Phase
After the first server disconnection, if no repair is done, the DC enters a
phase that we call the Survival Phase, during which it can operate with some
inaccessible servers. In this phase, we would like to analyze other performance
metrics, such as the path length, which is affected by failures. This can be
seen as a survivability measurement of the DCN, defined here as the DCN
performance after experiencing failures in its elements [22].
We evaluate the survivability using the performance metrics for a given
FER and Elapsed Time that corresponds to the Survival Phase. For example,
we can measure the expected number of connected servers when 10% of the
links are not working. Also, we can measure this same metric after 1 month of
DC operation. The survivability is evaluated by simulation using the method-
ology of Section 3.1.2. The metrics used in the evaluation are detailed next.
5.1 Metrics
5.1.1 Service Reachability
The Service Reachability quantifies at what level DC servers are reachable to
perform the desired tasks, by evaluating the number of accessible servers and
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their connectivity. This measure is important to quantify the DC processing
power, as it depends on the number of accessible servers. Also, it can represent
the DC capacity to store VMs in a cloud computing environment. The Service
Reachability can be measured by the following two metrics:
Accessible Server Ratio (ASR). This metric is the ratio between the
number of accessible servers and the total number of servers of the original
network, considering the current state of the network (i.e., a given FER). The
ASR is defined by
ASR =
∑
k∈A sk
|S|
, (15)
where sk and |S| are, respectively, the number of servers on the k accessible
subnetwork (k ∈ A) and on the original network (i.e., without failures). The
set of accessible subnetworks is given by A. The ASR metric is based on the
metric proposed in [23] to evaluate the robustness of complex networks. In
that work, the robustness is measured as the fraction of the total nodes that
after a random failure remains on the subnetwork with the largest number of
nodes. However, their metric is not suitable for DCNs since we must take into
account the existence of gateways and the existence of multiple operational
subnetworks, as highlighted in Section 3.3.
Server Connectivity (SC). The ASR is important to quantify how many
servers are still accessible in the network. Nevertheless, this metric, when used
alone, does not represent the actual DC parallel processing capacity or redun-
dancy. Accessible servers are not necessarily interconnected inside the DC. For
example, a network with 100 accessible servers in 2 isolated subnetworks of 50
servers each performs better when executing a parallel task than a network
with 100 accessible servers in 100 isolated subnetworks. As a consequence, we
enrich the ASR metric with the notion of connectivity between servers. This
connectivity is measured by evaluating the density of an auxiliary undirected
simple graph, where the nodes are the accessible servers (i.e., servers that still
have a path to a gateway) and an edge between two nodes indicates that they
can communicate with each other inside the DC. Note that the edges of this
graph that represent the reachability between servers are not related to the
physical links. In other words, the proposed metric is the density of the graph
of logical links between accessible servers. The density of an undirected simple
graph with |E| edges and Sa nodes is defined as ([24]):
2|E|
Sa(Sa − 1)
. (16)
In our case, |E| is the number of logical links and Sa =
∑
k∈A sk is the number
of accessible servers. Note that in a network without failures the density is
equal to 1 because every server can communicate with each other. In addition,
a network with failures presenting only one accessible subnetwork also has
this density equal to 1. The above evaluation can be simplified using the fact
that, after a failure, the graph of logical links in each isolated subnetwork is a
complete graph. Also, as subnetworks are isolated from each other, the value
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|E| is the sum of the number of edges of each subnetwork. As the subnetwork is
a complete graph, it has sk(sk−1)2 edges (i.e., pairs of accessible servers). Hence,
we replace the value |E| of Equation 16 according to the above reasoning, and
define SC as:
SC =
{∑
k∈A
sk(sk−1)
Sa(Sa−1)
, if Sa > 1;
0, otherwise.
(17)
Our SC metric is similar to the A2TR (Average Two Terminal Reliabil-
ity) [25]. The A2TR is defined as the probability that a random chosen pair
of nodes is connected in a network, and is also computed as the density of a
graph of logical links. However, SC differs from A2TR since in our metric, we
consider only the accessible servers, while A2TR considers any node. Hence,
if applied in our scenario, A2TR would consider switches, accessible servers,
and inaccessible servers.
5.1.2 Path quality
We measure the Path Quality by evaluating the shortest paths of each topol-
ogy. The shortest path length is suitable to evaluate the behavior of the quality
of paths in the network, since it is the basis of novel routing mechanisms that
can be used in DCs, such as TRILL [26], IEEE 802.1aq [27], and SPAIN [28].
Hence, we define the following metric:
Average Shortest Path Length. This metric is the average of the short-
est path lengths between the servers in the network. Note that in this analysis
we do not consider paths between servers of different isolated subnetworks,
since they do not have a path between them. The Average Shortest Path
Length captures the latency increase caused by failures.
5.2 Results
As stated in Section 3.1.2, failures can be characterized by using the FER and
Elapsed Time. The FER does not depend on the probability distribution of the
element lifetime, while the Elapsed Time assumes an exponential probability
distribution. Due to space constraints, most of the results in this section are
shown as a function of the FER, since they do not depend on the probability
distribution. However, the survivability comparison between the topologies
using the FER produces the same conclusions if we use the Elapsed Time.
This is because, using Equation 2, the Normalized Time for a given FER is
almost independent on the total number of elements F , being agnostic to a
specific topology and failure type. For example, we use Equation 2 to plot in
Figure 9 the Normalized Time as a function of the FER (i.e f
F
), for different
total number of elements F (e.g., total number of links). This figure shows
that, for a large range of the FER, the relationship between Normalized Time
and the FER is independent of F .
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Fig. 9 Normalized Time as a function of the Failed Elements Ratio.
As done in Section 4.3, we compare topologies that have approximately the
same number of servers. For the sake of conciseness, the results are provided
for the 3k-server topologies detailed in Table 1. On the other hand, we observe
that this number is sufficiently large to disclose the differences between the
investigated topologies. Furthermore, as these topologies have a regular struc-
ture, our conclusions can be extrapolated to a higher number of servers [29].
Finally, in this phase we provide results for a large range of the FER (i.e., from
0 to 0.4). Although this high failure ratio could be unrealistic for traditional
data centers, we choose to use this range to provide a generic analysis, suit-
able for different novel scenarios. For example, Modular Data Centers present
some challenges regarding their maintenance, which could make the DC opera-
tor wait for a high number of element failures before repairing the network [3].
5.2.1 Link Failures
Figures 10(a) and 10(b) plot, respectively, the ASR and SC as a function of
the FER. We observe that:
– Three-layer and Fat-tree Performance. Three-layer and Fat-tree have the
worst performance values because the servers are attached to the edge
switches using only one link. Hence, the failure of this link totally dis-
connects the server. In opposition, server-centric topologies have a slower
decay on ASR since servers have redundant links. The results for Fat-tree
show that a given Failed Links Ratio corresponds to a reduction in ASR
by the same ratio (e.g., a FER of 0.3 produces an ASR of 0.7), showing a
fast decay in Service Reachability. As Three-layer has a less redundant core
and aggregation layers than Fat-tree, its ASR tends to decay faster than
in the case of Fat-tree. As an example, Table 1 shows that for a network
with 3k servers, Fat-tree has almost three times the number of links than
the Three-layer topology.
– BCube and DCell Performance. For the same type of server-centric topol-
ogy, the survivability can be improved by increasing the number of network
interfaces per server. As servers have more interfaces, their disconnection
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Fig. 10 Survival Phase analysis for link failures.
by link failures will be harder and thus a given FER will disconnect less
servers. For example, considering a FER of 0.4, the ASR is improved by
11% in BCube and by 19% in DCell if we increase the number of server
interfaces from two to three. For the same number of server interfaces, the
survivability of BCube is better than DCell. For instance, BCube main-
tains at least an ASR of 0.84 when 40% of its link are down, while in DCell
this lower bound is 0.74. In DCell, each server is connected to 1 switch and
l servers, while in BCube the servers are connected to l + 1 switches. As
a switch has more network interfaces than a server, link failures tend to
disconnect less switches than servers. Consequently, the servers in BCube
are harder to disconnect from the network than in DCell. Obviously, the
better survivability comes at the price that BCube uses more wiring and
switches than DCell [3].
– General Remark. For all topologies, the SC is very close to 1, meaning that
link failures produce approximately only one subnetwork.
Figure 10(c) shows the Average Shortest Path Length as a function of the
FER. We can draw the following remarks:
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– Three-layer and Fat-tree Performance. Three-layer and Fat-tree keep their
original length independent of the FER, showing a better Path Quality
than other topologies as the FER increases.
– BCube and DCell Performance. The path length of server-centric topolo-
gies increases with the FER. BCube maintains a lower Average Shortest
Path Length than DCell, by comparing configurations with the same num-
ber of server interfaces. Moreover, for a high FER (0.4) DCell has an in-
crease of up to 7 hops in Average Shortest Path Length, while in BCube,
the maximum increase is 2 hops. Also, for a given topology, the Average
Shortest Path Length is greater when it has more server interfaces, even
when there are no failures. As more server interfaces imply more levels in
BCube and DCell, the paths contain nodes belonging to more levels and
thus have a greater length.
Analyzing the above results, we observe a tradeoff between Service Reach-
ability and Path Quality. On the one hand, the higher the number of server
interfaces, the better the network survivability regarding the number of acces-
sible servers. On the other hand, the higher the number of server interfaces,
the higher the Average Shortest Path Length. Hence, increasing the Service
Reachability by adding server interfaces implies a more relaxed requirement on
the Path Quality.
Figure 10(d) illustrates how the survivability evolves in time, by plotting
ASR as a function of the Normalized Time. This is the same experiment shown
in Figure 10(a), but using the X-axis as given by Equation 2, instead of f
F
.
Note that although Figure 10(a) shows the ASR up to a Failed Links Ratio
of 0.4, the last experimental point in Figure 10(d) is 2.3, which corresponds
approximately to a Failed Links Ratio of 0.9. The Normalized Time gives an
idea of how the survivability is related to the individual lifetime of a single
element, which is a link in this case. As a consequence, a Normalized Time
equal to 1 represents the mean lifetime of a link given by E[τ ]. As shown in
Figure 10(d), most of the topologies present a substantial degradation of ASR
when the Elapsed Time is equal to the mean link lifetime (Normalized Time
of 1). Also, all topologies have very small reachability when the elapsed time
is twice the link lifetime (Normalized Time equal to 2).
5.2.2 Switch Failures
Figures 11(a) and 11(b) plot, respectively, the ASR and SC according to the
Failed Switches Ratio. We observe that:
– Three-layer and Fat-tree Performance. Three-layer and Fat-tree present the
worst behavior due to the edge fragility. For Three-layer, a single failure on
an edge switch is enough to disconnect 48 servers, which is the number of
ports in this switch. For Fat-tree, a single failure on an edge switch discon-
nects n2 servers, where n is the number of switch ports, as seen in Figure 2.
Hence, for a 3k-server configuration, Fat-tree loses 242 = 12 servers for a
failure in an edge switch. Note that this number is four times lower than
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that of a Three-layer topology. In addition, the Three-layer topology relies
on only high-capacity gateways (i.e., core switches) to maintain all DC con-
nectivity, while Fat-Tree has 24 smaller core elements acting as gateways.
Although the comparison between Three-layer and Fat-tree is not neces-
sarily fair, since they have a different GPD (Section 3.3), the results show
how much relying on a small number of high-capacity aggregate and core
elements can decrease the topology performance. As in the case of links,
for Fat-tree, a given Failed Switches Ratio reduces the ASR by the same
ratio, while in Three-layer the performance impact is more severe.
– BCube and DCell Performance. As in the case of link failures, increasing
the number of server interfaces increases the survivability to switch fail-
ures. Considering a FER of 0.4 for BCube and DCell, the ASR is increased
respectively by 11% and 19% if we increase the number of server inter-
faces from two to three. In the case of BCube, a higher number of server
interfaces represents a higher number of switches connected per server.
Consequently, more switch failures are needed to disconnect a server. For
DCell, a higher number of server interfaces represents less dependence on
switches, as each server is connected to 1 switch and l servers. We can also
state that the survivability in DCell3 is slightly greater than in BCube3,
showing an ASR 6% higher for a FER of 0.4, while BCube2 and DCell2
have the same performance. The first result is due to less dependence on
switches in DCell, as explained in Section 4.3.2. In the particular case of
two server interfaces, this reasoning is not valid. Considering that the sur-
vivability is highly affected by min-cuts, each min-cut in DCell2 disconnects
two servers; whereas in BCube2, each min-cut disconnects only one server.
On the other hand, each Failed Switches Ratio in BCube2 represents ap-
proximately twice the absolute number of failed switches in DCell2. This
relationship can be seen in Table 1 where the total number of switches
in BCube2 is approximately twice the number of switches in DCell2. For
that reason, as the min-cuts have the same size in both topologies (Ta-
ble 3), a given Failed Switches Ratio in BCube2 will produce failures in
approximately twice the number of min-cuts as in DCell2. Hence, BCube2
has twice the number of affected min-cuts, whereas DCell2 has twice the
number of server disconnections per min-cut. Consequently, the number
of disconnected servers is approximately the same in both topologies for a
given Failed Switches Ratio.
– General Remark. SC is very close to 1 for all topologies, except for Three-
layer. For a single experimental round in Three-layer, we can only have two
possible SC values. In the first one, at least one gateway (core switch) is
up and we have one accessible subnetwork, and thus SC = 1. In the second
one, the two gateways are down (i.e., randomly chosen to be removed) and
thus SC = 0. As Figure 11(b) plots values averaged over all experimental
rounds, the SC measure is simply the percentage of the round that out-
comes SC = 1. As can be seen, the outcome SC = 1 is more frequent
since SC > 0.8 for the considered FER range. Hence, even in the case of
26 Rodrigo de Souza Couto et al.
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
A
cc
es
sib
le
 S
er
ve
r R
at
io
Failed Switches Ratio
(a) Accessible Server Ratio.
 0.8
 0.85
 0.9
 0.95
 1
 0  0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
Se
rv
er
 C
on
ne
ct
iv
ity
Failed Switches Ratio
(b) Server Connectivity.
 3
 6
 9
 12
 15
 0  0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4A
ve
ra
ge
 S
ho
rte
st 
Pa
th
 L
en
gt
h
Failed Switches Ratio
(c) Average Shortest Path Length.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5
A
cc
es
sib
le
 S
er
ve
r R
at
io
Normalized Time
(d) Accessible Server Ratio along the time.
Fig. 11 Survival Phase analysis for switch failures.
Three-layer which only has 2 gateways, we have a low probability that the
network is completely disconnected after the removal of random switches.
The results for Average Shortest Path Length on Figure 11(c) show that,
for all topologies, switch failures do not lead to a significant increase in path
length.
Figure 11(d) shows the evolution of ASR as a function of time, considering
switch failures. As for link failures, the last experimental point is approxi-
mately 2.3, corresponding to a Failed Switches Ratio of 0.9. Compared with
the results of link failures in Figure 10(d), we can see that the topologies
degrade slower under switch failures than under link failures, except for the
Three-layer topology. Also, we note the high survivability of DCell3, which
maintains a high ASR for a long time for switch failures. As stated before,
this behavior shows its low dependence on switches.
5.2.3 Server Failures
Figure 12(a) shows that, for all topologies, the ASR decreases linearly with
the Failed Servers Ratio. Although BCube and DCell depend on server for-
warding, their Service Reachability is equal to that of Fat-tree and Three-layer
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Fig. 12 Survival Phase analysis for server failures.
when servers are removed. It means that a server failure does not lead to a
disconnection of other servers in the network. For all topologies, the SC is
always very close to 1 for the considered range of the Failed Servers Ratio.
Despite the favorable results of Service Reachability under server failures,
Figure 12(c) shows that the path length in DCell slightly increases with failures
(up to 3 hops for a FER of 0.4), because DCell is more dependent on server
forwarding than the other topologies.
The evolution of the ASR in time is shown in Figure 12(d). This result
indicates that the Service Reachability of the remaining servers is not affected
by server failures for a long period.
5.2.4 Link and Switch Failures
In the previous results we isolate each failure type to provide a more accurate
comparison between the topologies. However, in a real data center environ-
ment, different failure types may coexist. Hence, in this section we analyze the
ASR of each topology by combining both link and switch failures. We focus
on the ASR metric since, as shown before, it is more affected by failures than
the other metrics. In addition, we do not consider server failures because it
does not have a significant impact in ASR, as shown in Section 5.2.3.
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Table 4 Qualitative performance of DCN topologies considering both Reliable and Survival
phases.
Failure Type Criterion Three-layer Fat-tree BCube DCell
Link
Reachability bad poor good fair
Path Quality excellent excellent good fair
Switch
Reachability bad poor good excellent
Path Quality excellent excellent excellent good
Server
Reachability excellent excellent excellent excellent
Path Quality excellent excellent excellent good
The results are shown in Figure 13. Each sub-figure represents the ASR
for a given topology. For better visualization, we omit the confidence intervals.
However, they are very narrow in this experiment. We observe that:
– Three-layer and Fat-tree Performance. Three-layer and Fat-tree present
the worst degradation in the ASR due to the fragility outlined in the pre-
vious results, when the failures are isolated. Note that Fat-tree performs
better than Three-layer, because it employs more redundancy of links and
switches.
– BCube and DCell Performance. BCube2 presents a slightly better surviv-
ability than DCell2, since for switch failures they perform equally, but
BCube2 has a better survivability considering link failures. However, in
the case of 3 interfaces, DCell3 performs slightly better than BCube3,
since DCell3 has a very high survivability considering switch failures that
compensates a worse performance to link failures. Note that BCube5 is
almost unaffected by failures in the considered FER range.
6 Qualitative Performance Analysis
Considering our results for the Reliable and Survival phases, Table 4 pro-
vides a qualitative comparison of DCN topologies in terms of Reachability
and Path Quality. The Reachability criterion combines the MTTF and the
Service Reachability (i.e., ASR), since these metrics are closely related (i.e., a
good MTTF implies a good Service Reachability). The topologies are evalu-
ated considering five qualitative levels: bad, poor, fair, good, and excellent. The
methodology used in this classification is detailed next in Section 6.1. Note that
switch failures do not incur severe performance degradation in server-centric
topologies. Hence, even if DCell performs better than BCube to switch fail-
ures, BCube still has a better overall performance since it is not classified as
“bad”, “poor” or “fair” in any criterion. Also, the Path Quality is not affected
considerably by any failure type.
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Fig. 13 Variation of Failed Links Ratio and Failed Switches Ratio in all considered range.
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6.1 Methodology employed in the Qualitative Analysis
We next detail the methodology employed in the analysis of Table 4, regarding
Reachability and Path Quality.
6.1.1 Reachability
For the Reachability analysis we use the following methodology:
– all topologies are considered as “excellent” in the server failure analysis
since, on average, server failures no not lead to the disconnection of the
remaining servers;
– Three-layer topology is the only one classified as “bad” for link and switch
failures, since the simulations show that it presents the worst performance;
– for link and switch failures, we use the performance of DCell3 for a Failed
Switches Ratio of 0.4 as a reference value for “excellent”. This topology
has an ASR very close to 1 for a high Failed Switches Ratio (0.4) and also
a high MTTF;
– for link and switch failures, we use the performance of Fat-tree for a Failed
Switches Ratio of 0.4 as a reference value for “poor”. In this topology, the
ASR decreases linearly according to the FER, and its MTTF is significantly
lower than in the other topologies, for both failure types;
– the performance of BCube5 is not considered, since we do not employ a
DCell with the same number of network interfaces;
– for a given failure type (link or switch), a topology is classified as “excel-
lent” if, for a FER value of 0.4, at least one of its configurations (i.e.,
number of network interfaces) has a performance near (difference of 0, 01
in the ASR) the reference value for “excellent”, and all configurations have
an ASR greater than 0.8;
– for a given failure type (link or switch), a topology is classified as “poor”
if, for a FER value of 0.4, at least one of its configurations (i.e., number
of network interfaces) has a performance near (difference of 0, 01 in the
ASR) the reference value for “poor”, and all configurations have an ASR
less than 0, 8;
– if a topology does not meet the requirements to be classified as “poor” or
“excellent”, it is classified as “good” if, for all configurations, the topol-
ogy has an ASR greater than 0.8 for a FER value of 0.4. Otherwise, it is
classified as “fair”.
6.1.2 Path Quality
For the Path Quality analysis we use the following methodology:
– as the Path Quality does not change significantly for all failure types, no
topology is considered as “bad” or “poor” using this criterion;
– the performance of BCube5 is not considered, since we do not employ a
DCell with the same number of network interfaces;
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– for a given failure type, a topology is considered as “excellent” if, for a FER
value of 0.4, all its configurations have an Average Shortest Path Length
less than or equal to 6. This reference value for “excellent” is the metric
evaluated for Fat-tree, which does not change when the failure increases;
– for a given failure type, a topology is considered as “fair” if, for a FER
value of 0.4, at least one of its configurations has an Average Shortest
Path Length greater than 12. This reference value for “fair” is twice the
value for “excellent”;
– for a given failure type, a topology is considered as “good” if it does not
meet the requirements to be classified as “fair” or “excellent”. Note that
for Path Quality, the requirements to consider a topology as “excellent” are
looser than for the Reachability case. This approach is adopted since, as
shown by the results of Section 5, the ASR variates more than the Average
Shortest Path Length if we increase the FER.
7 Gateway Port Density Sensibility Analysis
In this section, we study how the choice of the number of gateways, or Gateway
Port Density (GPD), influences the reliability and survivability of the DC. In
the case of survivability, we only evaluate the Service Reachability. The Path
Quality concerns the paths between servers inside the DC, thus not depending
on the choice of gateways.
The results of Sections 4 and 5 were obtained with the maximum GPD
(Section 3.3), which is 1 for Fat-Tree, BCube and DCell, and 0.007 for Three-
layer. In this section, we start by evaluating the metrics of each topology by
setting the minimum GPD of each one. In other words, we choose in each
topology only one switch to act as a gateway. As the network has only one
gateway in this experiment, we only evaluate the ASR since the SC is always
1 when at least one server is reachable. Our experiments show that the MTTF
and Service Reachability, considering link and server failures, are not substan-
tially affected when we set a minimum GPD, as compared to the case of a
maximum GPD. Hence, we only show in this section the results for switch
failures.
Figure 14 shows the results of the Reliable Phase for a minimum GPD.
Except for the case of DCell3, the reduction of MTTF and Critical FER is
small when compared with Figure 8(b). The results of DCell3 show that:
– Although DCell3 is highly reliable to switch failures, the choice of a min-
imum GPD produces a single point of failure that reduces to 29% in its
MTTF.
– Even with a minimum GPD, the reliability of DCell3 is still higher than
the one achieved by the other topologies with the maximum GPD, shown
in Figure 8(b).
Figure 15(a) shows that the survivability considering switch failures is
highly affected by the minimum GPD. Also, comparing the ASR between
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Fig. 14 Reliable Phase analysis for switch failures, using the minimum GPD.
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Fig. 15 GPD sensibility analysis in Survivable Phase for switch failures.
topologies of the same type (i.e., switch-centric or server-centric), the results
show that their performance is very close. With a minimum GPD, a high de-
crease on survivability is expected since the topologies have a single element
responsible for maintaining the connectivity of the whole network. Hence, the
network becomes totally disconnected if the gateway is down. Moreover, as
the FER increases, the probability of failure of this switch increases, reducing
the ASR on average.
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To complete the above analysis, Figure 15(b) shows the ASR according to
the GPD choice. This result is obtained by fixing the Failed Switches Ratio
to 0.05 and varying the GPD of each topology from its minimum GPD to
an approximate value of 0.05. Note that, although the curves are shown with
continuous lines to facilitate visualization, for each topology the two lowest
GPDs in the figure correspond to the utilization of 1 and 2 gateways. The
ASR reduces significantly only when the GPD is at a minimum, showing the
high robustness of the topologies regarding this value. Thus, we conclude that:
– The robustness to GPD is more related to the probability of gateway failure
than to the indirect loss of access to this element. This is explained by the
fact that the failure of links does not significantly reduce the reliability and
survivability, whereas switch failures do.
– The choice of the number of gateways has little influence on Service Reacha-
bility. Severe performance degradation, according to this parameter, is only
observed when a single switch is chosen and the network is prone to switch
failures.
It is important to note that this result does not address reliability and sur-
vivability according to the failure of the external access (i.e., ports connected
to the outside world) itself. The results shown here just prove that the access
to the gateways is not substantially affected by failed network elements, ex-
cept the gateway itself. Obviously, considering failures of the external access,
the reachability of the entire DC will increase as we increase their redun-
dancy. However, we do not analyze this type of failure, since we are interested
in evaluating the characteristics inside the DCN. Also, external accesses are
generally easier to monitor and repair as they are less numerous than other
network elements.
8 Heterogeneous Elements
In this work, we consider that all elements of a given type are equal and
assume that all servers have the same hardware characteristics. In this sec-
tion, we analyze the impact of these two assumptions in our results. First,
we analyze how the failure of different types of switches and links impact the
results for the Three-layer topology. Next, we redefine a Reachability metric
to consider heterogeneous servers. For both cases we focus on the ASR metric,
since its analysis in the previous results explain better the differences between
topologies.
8.1 Equipment Heterogeneity in Three-layer
The methodology described in Section 4 and employed in all the results of
Section 5, considers that all elements of a given type are equal. This is true
for Fat-tree, BCube and DCell since the main goal of their design is to use
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homogeneous low cost switches. However, the Three-layer topology employs
different switch types in each layer. Hence, we analyze this topology by con-
sidering three different types of switches and links. We perform this analysis
by choosing a different Failure Element Ratio depending on the switch or link
type.
Our analysis employs the three switch types specified in the Three-layer
topology definition: Edge, Aggregation, and Core. For a given analysis, we
combine the failures in two switch types. Figure 16(a) shows the results for
the Three-layer when varying the Failed Edge Switches Ratio, while keep-
ing the Failed Aggregation Switches Ratio fixed and considering that no Core
switch fails. Hence, each curve of Figure 16(a) represents a given Failed Aggre-
gation Switches Ratio. We choose three different FER values for Aggregation
switches: 0.0, 0.25, and 0.5. The results show that the impact of differentiat-
ing these two switch types is only significant for a high Failed Aggregation
Switches Ratio. In addition, note that the curves for the two lowest values
of the Failed Aggregation Switches Ratio (i.e., 0.0 and 0.25) in Figure 16(a)
are very close to the curve for the Fat-tree in Figure 11(a). This happens be-
cause, when we have a low failure ratio in the aggregation and in the core, the
survivability of the Three-layer is dominated by the effect of edge switches.
In Fat-tree, even when considering failure of all switches, the ASR is domi-
nated by the edge switches, since the aggregation and core layers of Fat-tree
are highly redundant. As the edge of Three-layer is identical to the edge of
Fat-tree, their survivability is close in this case. Figure 16(b) shows the ASR
according to the variation of the Failed Edge Switches Ratio for two values
of Failed Core Switches Ratio, while considering that no Aggregation switch
fails. Recall that, since we have only two Core switches, a failed ratio of 0.5
corresponds to one Core switch failure. The results show that, if only one core
switch fails, the remaining Core switch is enough to maintain the DC connec-
tivity. This can be easily confirmed by Figure 1 that shows that each Core
switch is connected to all Aggregation switches, allowing the network to oper-
ate with a single Core switch. Obviously, as core switches are the only gateways
in the Three-layer, the ASR is zero if the two Core switches fail. Again, as the
failure of one Core switch is negligible and no Aggregation switch fails, the
ASR for the Three-layer in Figure 16(b) becomes close to the ASR for Fat-tree
in Figure 11(a). Finally, Figure 16(c) shows the results when no edge switch
fails and we vary the Failed Aggregation Switches Ratio, keeping the Failed
Core Switches Ratio fixed in 0.0 or 0.25. The effect of one Core switch failure
is negligible for the same reason as before. Note that, when the Failed Edge
Switches Ratio is kept in zero, the Three-layer maintains high ASR values even
for the high Failed Aggregation Switches Ratios. This result shows, as already
mentioned in Section 5.2.2, that the edge has a major role on the survivability
of the Three-layer.
To analyze the heterogeneity of the links in Three-layer, we define three link
types: Edge, Aggregation, and Core. The first type corresponds to the links
between the Edge switches and servers. The second one corresponds to the
links between the Edge and Aggregation switches. The last type refers to the
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Fig. 16 ASR considering different switch failure types in Three-layer with 3456 servers.
links between the Aggregation and Core switches. Note that Three-layer also
has links between two Aggregation switches and between two Core switches,
as shown in Figure 1. We disregard these link types in this analysis, because
they do not affect the network survivability. Figure 17(a) shows the results
for Three-layer when varying the Failed Edge Links Ratio, while keeping the
Failed Aggregation Links Ratio fixed and considering that no Core link fails. As
in the case of switch failures analyzed before, the survivability of Three-layer
in Figure 17(a) becomes close to the survivability of Fat-tree in Figure 10(a)
when the Failed Aggregation Links Ratio is low. This same behavior applies
for the Failed Core Links Ratio, when we consider only failures of Edge and
36 Rodrigo de Souza Couto et al.
Core links in Figure 17(b). Also from Figure 17(b), note that the effect of
Core links in the survivability is low. Finally, Figure 17(c) shows that, if no
Edge links fail, the ASR can be kept at high values. As in the case of switch
failures, this result shows that Edge links play a major role in the survivability
of Three-layer. Considering the analysis of switches and links, the results show
that if a DC with the Three-layer topology employs high reliable equipment
in the core and in the aggregation layers, its survivability can be close to that
of Fat-tree.
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(c) Aggregation and Core link failures.
Fig. 17 ASR considering different link failure types in Three-layer with 3456 servers.
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8.2 Server Heterogeneity
Another assumption made in our methodology is that all servers are equal,
and thus the ASR accounts only the number of remaining servers in the net-
work. However, as stated by Zhang et. al [30], the servers in a DC are very
heterogeneous. In other words, different types of server hardware coexist in the
infrastructure, and each type has its own CPU and memory capacity. Hence,
the impact of disconnecting a high capacity server from the network is differ-
ent from disconnecting a low capacity one. To show the impact of assuming
homogeneous servers in the previous results, we propose another Reachability
metric based on the ASR, called the Remaining Capacity Ratio (RCR), which
takes into account the remaining capacity available after a failure. The RCR
metric is the ratio between the remaining capacity after a failure and the total
capacity of the original DC. The RCR is defined as:
RCR =
∑|S|
i=1 ziai∑|S|
i=1 zi
, (18)
where zi and ai are, respectively, the capacity of the server i and a binary
variable indicating if this server is connected (i.e., it has a path to a gateway)
after the failure. Hence, if server i is connected, then ai = 1, and ai = 0
otherwise. The total number of servers on the original network is given by
|S|. The capacity value can be defined according to the DC application. In
this section, we evaluate the RCR using CPU and memory capacity called,
respectively, the Remaining CPU Ratio and Remaining Memory Ratio.
To evaluate the RCR metric in the considered DC topologies, we employ
the information provided by Zhang et. al [30]. In this article, Zhang et. al
show the different types of servers employed in the DC, based on a real trace
provided by Google [31]. In addition, they show how many servers of a given
type are installed in the DC, as well as their corresponding capacity. In our
analysis, we use their information regarding the CPU and Memory capacity.
These values are normalized in [30], so that the most powerful CPU or memory
type has a capacity equal to 1. Their data shows ten different types of machines
for a DC with approximately 12,000 servers. As our analysis comprises about
3,400 servers, we scale their number of servers to our DC size, by evaluating
the fraction of servers from each type. Since six of their reported types together
represent less than 1% of the servers (i.e., less than 34 servers in our case), we
consider these six types as one single type. This single type is the one with
the highest number of servers among these six. Consequently, we have five
machine types in our scenario, given by Table 5. In this table, we adopt the
same type number specified in [30].
It is reasonable to expect that the survivability given by the RCR is higher
in DCs where the capacity is uniformly distributed among the topology mod-
ules (e.g., the pods of Fat-Tree or a group of servers in Three-layer where the
connectivity is maintained by the same pair of aggregation switches). When
the capacity is uniformly distributed, if the entire module fails (e.g., if the pair
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Table 5 Real dataset of server capacities, based on Google traces.
Type Number CPU Capacity Memory Capacity Fraction of Servers
1 0.50 0.50 0.53
2 0.50 0.25 0.31
3 0.50 0.75 0.08
4 1.00 1.00 0.07
5 0.25 0.25 0.01
Table 6 Synthetic dataset of server capacities.
Type Number CPU Capacity Memory Capacity Fraction of Servers
1 1.00 1.00 0.16666666667
2 0.20 0.20 0.83333333333
of aggregation switches in Three-layer fails), the effect is lower than in the case
were the failed module concentrates the most powerful servers. Hence, for each
employed dataset, we choose two capacity distributions among the DC servers.
In the first one, called Balanced, we try to balance the total server capacity
inside each topology module. For example, we try to assign, as much as possi-
ble, different server types in a Pod for Fat-tree, in a module for Three-layer, in
lower level DCells for DCell and lower level BCubes for BCube. On the other
hand, in the distribution called Unbalanced, we try to put, as much as possible,
servers of the same type together in the same module. To analyze the impact
of capacity distribution, we build a synthetic dataset where approximately
17% of the servers concentrate 50% of the capacity. We choose the value of
17% since it corresponds to the fraction of servers inside a single module in
Three-layer and, as we show next, we use this topology as a reference in our
analysis.
We first perform the experiments for RSR employing the same method-
ology of Section 3.2, using both datasets and the two capacity distributions.
Consequently, we remove from the network a random number of switch or
links, and evaluate the RSR metric using its average value achieved in the
simulation. Since the values are averaged, it is expected that the dataset and
the capacity distribution play no major role on the DC survivability. It is
true because in some simulation rounds the module with a high capacity may
fail, but in other ones, the module with a low capacity fails. Hence, we do
not expect substantial differences between the results for a heterogeneous DC
and a homogeneous DC. For the sake of conciseness, in Figure 18 we show
only the results for the CPU capacity of Three-layer when prone to switch
failures. We choose this topology since it is the most fragile among the con-
sidered topologies, and thus, the heterogeneity tends to have a higher impact.
The figure shows the results for each dataset employing the Balanced and Un-
balanced distributions, as well as a reference curve for the homogeneous case
(i.e., where all servers have the same capacity). As can be noted by Figure 18,
the heterogeneity has a very low impact in the RSR when considering average
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values. Hence, the results for the RSR metric from Figure 18 become close to
those for the ASR metric in Figure 11(a).
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(a) Real data extracted from Google dataset.
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(b) Synthetic data.
Fig. 18 Remaining CPU Ratio considering different switch failure types in Three-layer with
3456 servers.
As shown before, the average values of RCR do not capture the impact
in the survivability caused by server heterogeneity. Therefore, we perform an
analysis in the Three-layer topology by removing a given pair of aggregation
switches. In Three-layer topology, removing an aggregation switch pair discon-
nects an entire module, which is a group of 576 servers when the entire DC
has 3,456 servers. In this experiment, we choose to remove the module that
concentrates the highest CPU or RAM capacity. Figures 19(a) and 19(b) show,
respectively, the RCR results for CPU and RAM using the different datasets
and capacity distribution. We also plot the results for the homogeneous case
for reference5. The values of RCR are deterministic since we remove a specific
pair of Aggregation switches. The results show that, as expected, the Balanced
distributions lead to a higher survivability for both datasets. However, the im-
pact of balancing server capacity is higher for the Synthetic dataset, since
the two existent server types have very different capacity values, as shown in
Table 6 . For the Google DC case, we note that considering CPU capacity,
the difference between the two capacity distributions is small. This happens
since three types of servers in this dataset have the same CPU capacity, as
shown in Table 5. Furthermore, these three types together correspond to 92%
of the servers. On the other hand, we can note that the difference between the
Balanced and Unbalanced cases is significant for memory capacity. This hap-
pens since memory configurations are more heterogeneous in the real dataset;
from five machine types, we have four memory capacities, as shown in Table 5.
Finally, we can note that, considering a real dataset and a balanced capac-
ity distribution, the performance of Three-layer in a heterogeneous scenario is
close to the homogeneous scenario. The same methodology employed in these
results applies to the other topologies considered in this work. However, as
5 For the homogeneous case, the Balanced and Unbalanced results correspond to the same
scenario, since all servers are equal
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they have a more redundant network and thus higher survivability, the effect
of heterogeneity is even lower.
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Fig. 19 Remaining Capacity Ratio considering the removal of an entire module in Three-
layer with 3456 servers.
9 Related Work
Our work provides an analysis of DC reliability and survivability considering
the utilization of recently proposed DCN topologies. In some sense, it comple-
ments the existing study presented in [3] where the performance of Fat-tree,
BCube, and DCell are compared considering switch and server failures. In that
work, Guo et al. evaluated the survivability of those topologies by defining the
ABT (Aggregate Bottleneck Throughput) metric. To evaluate this metric, they
consider that every server is sending a packet flow to all other servers. They
define the bottleneck throughput as the lowest throughput achieved among
the flows. Hence, the ABT is defined as the number of existent flows times the
throughput of the bottleneck flow. Their evaluation uses a single configuration
for each topology (BCube and DCell with respectively 4 and 3 server inter-
faces and a Fat-tree with 5 switch levels) with a total number of 2,048 servers.
Furthermore, they considered the utilization of the routing schemes originally
proposed for each of the three architectures. They concluded that BCube per-
forms well under both server and switch failures, and Fat-tree suffers from
a high ABT drop when switches fail. On the other hand, the results showed
that DCell has a low ABT even in the case of zero failures, but this value does
not significantly change under failures. Our work differs from [3] in that our
analysis is not restricted to specific traffic patterns and routing schemes, but
is instead generic with focus on topological aspects. Also, we provide addi-
tional metrics that allow an evaluation of the reliability and the survivability
of each topology, and analyze the relationship between their number of server
network interfaces and their robustness to failures. Finally, we evaluate the
Service Reachability, which was not addressed by Guo et al..
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Bilal et al. [29] analyzed the robustness of Fat-tree, DCell, and a topology
with three switch layers, demonstrating that classical robustness metrics de-
rived from graph theory (e.g., average nodal degree) do not alone provide an
accurate robustness factor for DCNs. Similarly to Guo et al. and to our work,
they measure different metrics by varying the number of failed elements. They
propose a metric that accounts for all metrics analyzed in their work, and
use it to conclude that DCell outperforms the robustness of Fat-Tree and the
topology with three switch layers, while this last one has the worst robustness
performance. Different from their work, we analyze in more detail the behav-
ior of Server Reachability according to failures, allowing us to highlight some
topological characteristics that make a topology more robust to a given type
of failures. In addition, we provide an analysis for different number of server
ports in BCube and DCell, while they focused on a specific DCell configura-
tion with two different sizes and did not analyze BCube. Finally, we provide
an evaluation of DC degradation according to the time, which also allows us
to model and analyze the MTTF of the considered topologies.
Our previous work [32] provides a comparison of the survivability (i.e.,
metrics in the Survivable Phase) of the above-mentioned topologies. In the
present article, we extend the analysis by adding metrics such as those of
the Reliable Phase and all the analysis considering the Elapsed Time. We
also redefine the metrics of survivability used in that work to provide a more
realistic analysis, by considering the existence of gateways.
Still considering DC topologies, Ni et al. [33] provided a theoretical analysis
of bandwidth requirements for the switch-centric topologies Fat-tree and VL2,
considering the failure of k links in the network. They concluded that Fat-tree
requires less link capacity than VL2 to support (i.e., provide full bandwidth
communication between servers) k failures when k is small. For large values
of k, VL2 outperforms Fat-tree.
There are also studies that have provided measurements in real DCs to
investigate their reliability. Vishwanath and Nagappan [34] provided a char-
acterization of server failures in DCs, by analyzing an environment with over
100,000 servers spread in different countries and continents. Among other ob-
servations, they concluded that the causes of most server failures are faulty
hard disks. Gill et al. [20] measured the impact of network components on
DC reliability. They used logs of failure events of some production DCs. Al-
though they did not provide measurements using alternative DCN topologies,
they stated that commodity switches are highly reliable. Consequently, a high
degree of reliability can be achieved by using low-cost topologies such as Fat-
tree, BCube and DCell. Also, they highlighted that legacy DCNs are highly
reliable, presenting more than four 9‘s of availability for about 80% of the links
and for about 60% of the network devices. Nevertheless, as their study focused
on legacy DCNs, this conclusion could not apply to emerging DCN scenarios
such as Modular Data Centers (MDC) and low-cost architectures.
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10 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this work, we evaluated the behavior of recently proposed DCN topologies
considering that their different elements are prone to failures. The results allow
us to conclude which topology behaves better for a given failure scenario. We
can state that:
– The conventional Three-layer DC configuration has a lower redundancy
level of links and switches than the alternative data center architectures.
Hence, it shows the worst behavior when comparing to Fat-tree, BCube,
and DCell to both link and switch failures. However, Three-layer can
achieve survivability values close to those of Fat-tree, if it employs highly
reliable equipment in the aggregation and core layers. Fat-tree has a high
redundant core but a vulnerable edge, which reduces its robustness to fail-
ures as compared to BCube and DCell. In Fat-tree, when a given fraction
of the total links or switches fail, the same fraction of servers is discon-
nected. Consequently, Fat-tree shows a substantially lower performance
than BCube and DCell, which lose no more than 26% of their servers for a
high percentage of failed elements (40%). Also, Fat-tree achieves an MTTF
at least 42 times lower than other server-centric topologies for link failures
and at least 7.2 times lower for switch failures. On the other hand, Three-
layer and Fat-tree maintain their original path length, while in BCube and
DCell a high failure ratio can increase the average path length by 2 and
7 hops, respectively. Nevertheless, the increase in path length for server-
centric topologies is generally not severe as compared with the server reach-
ability degradation in switch-centric ones.
– BCube performs better than the other topologies in environments with
predominant link failures, maintaining at least 84% of its servers when 40%
of the links are down, against 74% in DCell. This is explained because, as a
server-centric network, BCube employs redundant server interfaces. Also,
the servers are directly connected only to switches. As switches in BCube
have a higher degree than servers, the disconnection of the network by link
removal will be harder in BCube than in DCell, since this last one employs
servers directly connected to each other.
– DCell presents the best performance under switch failures, being able to
achieve an MTTF up to 12 times higher than BCube. This behavior is
explained by the high dependence on servers to maintain a connected net-
work.
By adding server interfaces, we have also shown that the improvement in
reliability and survivability is upper bounded by the maximum tolerated path
length. This happens because, even in the case without failures, increasing
the number of servers interfaces in BCube and DCell increases the Average
Shortest Path Length. Concerning server-centric topologies, we found that
although they rely on servers to forward packets, a server failure does not lead
to the disconnection of the remaining servers.
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Finally, we have also shown that the min-cut is an appropriate metric to
approximate the reliability for link failures. Hence, we provided closed-form
MTTF formulas for the considered topologies. For switch failures, the results
show that the utilization of min-cuts is not well suited for some topologies.
In our future work, we will aim at evaluating the performance of DCN
topologies considering correlated failures (e.g., failure of an entire rack), re-
laxing the assumption of independence between failures. Also, an interesting
direction is to build more scenarios where all the three failure types (i.e., link,
switch and server) coexist, complementing the study of Section 5.2.4.
A MTTF Approximation
In this appendix we obtain Equation 6, derived from the combination of Equations 4 and 5.
First, we replace the reliability R(t) in Equation 4 by the reliability approximation given by
Equation 5, resulting in
MTTF =
∫ ∞
0
R(t) dt ≈
∫ ∞
0
e
− t
r
c
E[τ]r dt. (19)
Hence, we find the MTTF by evaluating the integral in the rightmost term of Equation 19.
The evaluation starts by performing the following variable substitution:
t = x
1
r ⇔ dt =
1
r
x(
1
r
−1) dx. (20)
Note that the interval of integration in Equation 19 does not change after the variable
substitution, since t = 0 results in x = 0 and t → ∞ results in x → ∞. Hence, after the
variable substitution, we can write Equation 19 as:
MTTF ≈
1
r
∫ ∞
0
x(
1
r
−1)e
−xc
E[τ]r dx. (21)
The integral of Equation 21 is evaluated using the gamma function defined as [21]:
Γ (z) = kz
∫ ∞
0
xz−1e−kx dx, (ℜz > 0,ℜk > 0). (22)
For better clarity, we rewrite the integral of Equation 22 as:
∫ ∞
0
xz−1e−kx dx =
Γ (z)
kz
. (23)
We make z = 1
r
and k = c
E[τ ]r
in Equation 23 and multiply its both sides by 1
r
, obtaining
1
r
∫ ∞
0
x(
1
r
−1)e
− xc
E[τ]r dx =
1
r
Γ
(
1
r
)
c
E[τ ]r
1
r
=
E[τ ]
r
r
√
1
c
Γ
(
1
r
)
. (24)
Note that the leftmost term in Equation 24 is the MTTF approximation given by Equa-
tion 21. Hence, we can write the MTTF as:
MTTF ≈
E[τ ]
r
r
√
1
c
Γ
(
1
r
)
. (25)
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B Comparison of MTTF equations for link failures
In BCube we have MTTFbcube ≈
E[τ ]
l+1
l+1
√
1
|S|
Γ
(
1
l+1
)
. Hence, we will start by showing
that if we have a new configuration with l′ = l + 1 (i.e., one more server interface) we can
increase the MTTF. For simplicity, we consider that |S| is equal for the configurations using
both l and l′. Although it is not necessarily true, because the number of servers depends on
the combination of l and n, we can adjust n to have a close number of servers for l and l′,
as done on the configurations of Table 1. First, we need to state that
E[τ ]
l′ + 1
l
′+1
√
1
|S|
Γ
(
1
l′ + 1
)
>
E[τ ]
l + 1
l+1
√
1
|S|
Γ
(
1
l + 1
)
. (26)
Doing l′ = l + 1, and rearranging the terms we have the following requirements for the
above formulation to be true:
|S| >

 l + 2
l + 1
Γ
(
1
l+1
)
Γ
(
1
l+2
)


(l+1)(l+2)
. (27)
The right term of Equation 27 is a decreasing function of l over the considered region
(l ≥ 1). Hence, it is sufficient to prove that Equation 27 is true for l = 1. Doing l = 1 in
Equation 27, we have |S| > 0.955, which is true for a feasible DC.
As DCell with l > 1 has the same MTTF of a BCube with the same l, the above
reasoning is valid for this topology. For DCell2 (l = 1), the equation of the MTTF is
the same of BCube2 (l = 1) except that DCell2 has the value
√
1
1.5|S|
instead of
√
1
|S|
.
Consequently, the MTTF of BCube2 is greater than that of DCell2. We can thus conclude
that DCell2 has the lowest MTTF among server-centric topologies. Hence, to show that the
MTTF of Fat-tree is smaller than the MTTF of all server-centric topologies, we compare it
to DCell2. We thus need to prove that
E[τ ]
|S|
<
E[τ ]
2
√
1
1.5|S|
Γ
(
1
2
)
. (28)
The solution of this equation is |S| > 1.909, which is always true considering a real DC.
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank FAPERJ, CNPq, CAPES, CTIC
research agencies and the Systematic FUI 15 RAVIR (http://www.ravir.io) project for
their financial support to this research.
References
1. Jennings, B., Stadler, R.: Resource management in clouds: Survey and research chal-
lenges. Journal of Network and Systems Management 23(3), 567–619
2. Al-Fares, M., Loukissas, A., Vahdat, A.: A scalable, commodity data center network
architecture. In: ACM SIGCOMM, pp. 63–74 (2008)
3. Guo, C., Lu, G., Li, D., Wu, H., Zhang, X., Shi, Y., Tian, C., Zhang, Y., Lu, S.: BCube:
a high performance, server-centric network architecture for modular data centers. In:
ACM SIGCOMM, pp. 63–74 (2009)
4. Guo, C., Wu, H., Tan, K., Shi, L., Zhang, Y., Lu, S.: DCell: a scalable and fault-tolerant
network structure for data centers. In: ACM SIGCOMM, pp. 75–86 (2008)
5. Greenberg, A., Hamilton, J., Maltz, D.A., Patel, P.: The cost of a cloud: Research
problems in data center networks. SIGCOMM Computer Communnication Review
39(1), 68–73 (2009)
6. Popa, L., Ratnasamy, S., Iannaccone, G., Krishnamurthy, A., Stoica, I.: A cost compar-
ison of datacenter network architectures. In: ACM CoNEXT, pp. 16:1–16:12 (2010)
Reliability and Survivability Analysis of Data Center Network Topologies 45
7. Li, D., Guo, C., Wu, H., Tan, K., Zhang, Y., Lu, S., Wu, J.: Scalable and cost-effective
interconnection of data-center servers using dual server ports. IEEE/ACM Transactions
on Networking 19(1), 102 –114 (2011)
8. Kachris, C., Tomkos, I.: A survey on optical interconnects for data centers. IEEE
Communications Surveys Tutorials 14(4), 1021–1036 (2012)
9. Singla, A., Hong, C., Popa, L., Godfrey, P.: Jellyfish: Networking data centers, randomly.
In: USENIX NSDI, p. 14 p. (2012)
10. Curtis, A., Carpenter, T., Elsheikh, M., Lo´pez-Ortiz, A., Keshav, S.: REWIRE: An
optimization-based framework for unstructured data center network design. In: IEEE
INFOCOM, pp. 1116–1124 (2012)
11. Raiciu, C., Barre, S., Pluntke, C., Greenhalgh, A., Wischik, D., Handley, M.: Improving
datacenter performance and robustness with multipath TCP. In: ACM SIGCOMM, pp.
350–361 (2011)
12. Meng, X., Pappas, V., Zhang, L.: Improving the scalability of data center networks with
traffic-aware virtual machine placement. In: IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 1–9. IEEE (2010)
13. Cisco Data Center Infrastructure 2.5 Design Guide (2007).
www.cisco.com/application/pdf/en/us/guest/netsol/ns107/c649/
ccmigration 09186a008073377d.pdf - Accessed October 2014
14. Greenberg, A., Hamilton, J.R., Jain, N., Kandula, S., Kim, C., Lahiri, P., Maltz, D.A.,
Patel, P., Sengupta, S.: VL2: a scalable and flexible data center network. In: ACM
SIGCOMM, pp. 51–62 (2009)
15. Hagberg, A., Swart, P., S Chult, D.: Exploring network structure, dynamics, and func-
tion using NetworkX. Tech. rep., (LANL) (2008)
16. Egeland, G., Engelstad, P.: The availability and reliability of wireless multi-hop networks
with stochastic link failures. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 27(7),
1132–1146 (2009)
17. Rahman, M.R., Aib, I., Boutaba, R.: Survivable virtual network embedding. In: NET-
WORKING 2010, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6091, pp. 40–52. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg (2010)
18. Barlow, R., Proschan, F.: Statistical theory of reliability and life testing: probability
models, 1 edn. Holt, Rinehart and Winston (New York) (1975)
19. Gertzbakh, I., Shpungin, Y.: Models of network reliability: analysis, combinatorics, and
Monte Carlo, 1 edn. CRC Press (2009)
20. Gill, P., Jain, N., Nagappan, N.: Understanding network failures in data centers: mea-
surement, analysis, and implications. In: ACM SIGCOMM, pp. 350–361 (2011)
21. Abramowitz, M., Stegun, I.A.: Handbook of Mathematical Functions: With Formulars,
Graphs, and Mathematical Tables, 9 edn. Dover Books on Mathematics, New York
(1970)
22. Liew, S.C., Lu, K.W.: A framework for characterizing disaster-based network surviv-
ability. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 12(1), 52–58 (1994)
23. Albert, R., Jeong, H., Baraba´si, A.: Error and attack tolerance of complex networks.
Letters to Nature 406(6794), 378–382 (2000)
24. Coleman, T.F., More´, J.J.: Estimation of sparse jacobian matrices and graph coloring
blems. SIAM journal on Numerical Analysis 20(1), 187–209 (1983)
25. Neumayer, S., Modiano, E.: Network reliability with geographically correlated failures.
In: IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 1–9 (2010)
26. Touch, J., Perlman, R.: Transparent interconnection of lots of links TRILL: Problem
and applicability statement. RFC 5556, (2009)
27. Allan, D., Ashwood-Smith, P., Bragg, N., Farkas, J., Fedyk, D., Ouellete, M., Seaman,
M., Unbehagen, P.: Shortest path bridging: Efficient control of larger ethernet networks.
IEEE Communications Magazine 48(10), 128–135 (2010)
28. Mudigonda, J., Yalagandula, P., Al-Fares, M., Mogul, J.: SPAIN: COTS data-center
ethernet for multipathing over arbitrary topologies. In: USENIX NSDI, p. 16 p. (2010)
29. Bilal, K., Manzano, M., Khan, S., Calle, E., Li, K., Zomaya, A.: On the characterization
of the structural robustness of data center networks. IEEE Transactions on Cloud
Computing 1(1), 64–77 (2013)
30. Zhang, Q., Zhani, M., Boutaba, R., Hellerstein, J.: Dynamic heterogeneity-aware re-
source provisioning in the cloud. IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing 2(1), 14–28
(2014)
46 Rodrigo de Souza Couto et al.
31. Googleclusterdata - Traces of Google Workloads (2011).
http://code.google.com/p/googleclusterdata/ - Accessed May 2015
32. Couto, R.S., Campista, M.E.M., Costa, L.H.M.K.: A reliability analysis of datacenter
topologies. In: IEEE GLOBECOM, pp. 1890—1895 (2012)
33. Ni, W., Huang, C., Wu, J.: Provisioning high-availability datacenter networks for full
bandwidth communication. Computer Networks 68, 71–94 (2014)
34. Vishwanath, K.V., Nagappan, N.: Characterizing cloud computing hardware reliability.
In: ACM SOCC, pp. 193–204 (2010)
Rodrigo S. Couto received his Doctor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering in 2015
and his cum laude Electronics and Computing Engineer degree in 2011, both from Uni-
versidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). Since March 2015 he has been an Associate
Professor with the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ). His major research
interests include data center networks, cloud computing, network reliability and network
virtualization.
Stefano Secci is an Associate Professor at the University Pierre and Marie Curie (UPMC -
Paris VI, Sorbonne Universites). He received a Laurea degree in Telecommunications Engi-
neering from Politecnico di Milano, in 2005, and a dual Ph.D. degree in computer networks
from the same institution and Telecom ParisTech, in 2009. His current research interests are
about Internet resiliency and Cloud networking.
Miguel Elias M. Campista is an associate professor with Universidade Federal do Rio de
Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where he works since 2010. He received his Telecom-
munications Engineer degree from the Fluminense Federal University (UFF), Nitero´i, Brazil,
in 2003 and his M.Sc. and D.Sc. degrees in Electrical Engineering from UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, in 2005 and 2008, respectively. His major research interests are in wireless networks,
routing, home networks, and complex networks.
Lu´ıs Henrique M. K. Costa received his Electronics Engineer and M.Sc. degrees in Elec-
trical Engineering from Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, respectively, and a Dr. degree from the Universite´ Pierre et Marie Currie (Paris
6), Paris, France, in 2001. Since August 2004 he has been an associate professor with
COPPE/UFRJ. His major research interests are in the areas of routing, wireless networks,
and future Internet.
